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As wireless communication technology evolves continuously, mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) become highly appealing for supporting lots of critical applications in
daily life. However, due to the open nature of wireless medium, wireless communica-
tion is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks by unauthorized receivers (eavesdroppers),
posing a great threat to the security of MANETs. Recently, a promising security ap-
proach, called physical layer (PHY) security, has been proposed to provide a strong
security guarantee by exploiting the inherent physical properties of wireless channels,
such as noise, interference and time-varying fading. Compared to the cryptography-
based methods, the PHY security technology can provide an everlasting security guar-
antee without the need of costly secret key management/distribution and complex
cryptographic protocols. This thesis therefore focuses on the secure protocol design
and performance analysis of MANETs based on the typical PHY security techniques
(i.e., secrecy guard zone, cooperative jamming, artificial noise).
For cell-partitioned MANETs, we first consider a scenario where each transmit-
ter can detect the existence of eavesdroppers in a region around itself, called secrecy
guard zone (SGZ). For this scenario, we propose an SGZ-based secure transmission
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protocol, in which the transmission of a selected transmitter will be conducted only
if no eavesdroppers exist in its SGZ. To understand the security performance of the
SGZ-based secure transmission protocol, we first derive two basic secure transmission
probabilities of the network by applying the classical Probability Theory. We then
obtain the exact secrecy throughput capacity of the concerned network under the
SGZ-based secure transmission protocol based on the analysis of two secure trans-
mission probabilities. Finally, we present extensive simulation and numerical results
to validate our theoretical analysis and also to illustrate the impacts of the SGZ-based
secure transmission protocol on the secrecy throughput capacity performance.
For cell-partitioned MANETs, we then consider a new scenario where each trans-
mitter can know the exact locations of eavesdroppers in its transmission range. For
this scenario, we propose a cooperative jamming (CJ) based secure transmission pro-
tocol, which allows non-transmitting legitimate nodes to send artificial noise to sup-
press eavesdroppers. The transmission of a selected transmitter will be conducted
only if all eavesdroppers in the transmission range of the transmitter are suppressed.
To understand the security performance of the proposed secure transmission proto-
col, based on the classical Probability Theory, we first conduct analysis on two basic
secure transmission probabilities of the network. We then derive the exact analytical
expression for the secrecy throughput capacity of the network under the CJ-based
secure transmission protocol. Finally, extensive simulation and numerical results are
provided to verify the theoretical analysis also to illustrate the impacts of the CJ-
based secure transmission protocol on the secrecy throughput capacity performance.
For continuous MANETs, by combining PHY security techniques and the con-
ventional Aloha protocol, we propose two secure Aloha protocols, i.e., artificial noise
(AN)-based Aloha protocol and secrecy guard zone (SGZ)-based Aloha protocol, to
ensure secure medium access for legitimate transmitters. In the AN-based Aloha
protocol, all potential transmitters (i.e., transmitters scheduled by the conventional
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Aloha protocol) are allowed to be active and each active transmitter injects AN into
its transmitted signals to confuse eavesdroppers. In the SGZ-based protocol, each
potential transmitter has an SGZ, a circle centered at itself, and only the potential
transmitters whose SGZ contains no eavesdroppers are allowed to be active. To un-
derstand both the security and reliability performance of the proposed secure Aloha
protocols, we first apply tools from Stochastic Geometry to derive analytical expres-
sions for the connection outage probability (COP) as well as the upper and lower
bounds on the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the considered network under
both the AN-based Aloha protocol and SGZ-based Aloha protocol. Based on the
COP and SOP, we then derive the secrecy transmission capacity of the network un-
der both protocols. Finally, we provide simulation/numerical results to validate the
theoretical analysis of COP and SOP and also to show the impacts of secure Aloha
protocols on the secrecy transmission capacity performance.
v
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In this chapter, we first introduce the background of mobile ad hoc networks and
physical layer security, and then we present the objective and main works of this
thesis. Finally, we give the outline and main notations of this thesis.
1.1 Research Background
1.1.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Amobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a continuously self-configuring, self-organizing
and infrastructure-less network of mobile devices connected without wires [1, 2]. Each
device in a MANET can move in any direction freely and independently, so the com-
munication links among devices can be frequently changed. Each device collaborates
by forwarding any incoming traffic, therefore, acting as a router. The basic challenge
of constructing a MANET is providing each device with the required information
needed to route the incoming traffic to the destinations in a fast and reliable manner.
A MANET often appears in scenarios where there is no network infrastructure
or it is inconvenient to use the existing network infrastructure. The MANETs find
lots of important applications in different areas. First, the well-known mobile con-
ference is created using MANET technology. People use their notebooks to form a
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communication network anytime and anywhere, which is convenient for data shar-
ing, information exchange and discussion. Second, MANETs can realize the inter-
connection of personal area networks (PAN). A PAN only contains devices closely
related to one person, and these devices cannot be connected to a wide area network.
Bluetooth technology is a typical PAN technology, but it can only achieve indoor
short-range communications. Therefore, MANET provides the possibility of estab-
lishing a multi-hop interconnection among PANs. Third, MANETs can also be used
for disaster recovery. When the network infrastructure fails due to natural disasters
or other reasons, it is very important to quickly restore communication. With the
help of MANET technology, it is possible to quickly establish a temporary network
and extend the network infrastructure, thereby reducing the rescue time and damage
caused by disasters. However, due to the open nature of wireless medium, wire-
less communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks by unauthorized receivers
(eavesdroppers), posing a great threat to the security of MANETs.
1.1.2 Physical Layer Security
Traditionally, the security of wireless communications is guaranteed by cryptogra-
phy, which relies on solving various computationally difficult problems (e.g., Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) problem [3], Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem
[4], Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem [5]). Recently, another promising security ap-
proach, called physical layer (PHY) security [6–12], has been proposed to provide a
stronger security guarantee by exploiting the inherent physical properties of wireless
channels, such as noise, interference and time-varying fading. As adversaries (eaves-
droppers) may not have enough computing power, they can hardly solve the difficult
problems of the cryptography. Thus, cryptographic approaches are still the main
practical and effective security methods for wireless networks nowadays, and in most
cases the PHY security technology is regarded as a complement for cryptography
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to improve the achieved security. However, as the computing power of eavesdrop-
pers develops (for example, adopting the quantum computing [13]), current crypto-
graphic methods may face the increasingly high risk of being broken. By then, the
PHY security technology may be widely applied to provide a strong form of security
guarantee for wireless networks. Compared to the cryptography-based methods, the
PHY security technology can provide an everlasting security guarantee without the
need of costly secret key management/distribution and complex cryptographic proto-
cols. Therefore, although the PHY security technology usually comes with a reduced
throughput, it is still envisioned as a promising security mechanism for MANETs.
The PHY security technologies are mainly divided into three categories: secure
channel coding technology, PHY security key generation technology and PHY security
transmission technology.
The secure channel coding technology achieves the secure communication by de-
signing channel coding schemes. The information theory [14–17] states that as long
as the secrecy capacity is greater than 0, there exists a channel coding scheme that
allows the probability of error at the receiver to be made arbitrarily small, while the
amount of information obtained by eavesdroppers is arbitrarily small. However, it
is a challenging task to design a secure channel coding scheme that is suitable for
existing communication systems. Previous studies [18–27] have designed a variety
of coding schemes based on Wyner’s weak and strong security conditions, but these
works either have a loss of security or lack of practicality. So secure channel coding
schemes need to be further studied.
Based on the randomness and uniqueness of wireless channels in both time and
space, the basic idea of the PHY security key generation technology [28–31] is that
legitimate nodes may use the common channel between each other to generate the
same bit sequence, which can serve as the key. But eavesdroppers cannot generate the
same key due to different random fading. This technology can be used as one of the key
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generation and deployment schemes to ensure information security by combining with
the encryption technology for wireless networks. Existing works have applied different
technologies for key generation, such as ultra-wide band pulse, signal strength and
differential phase detection. The PHY security key generation technology suffers from
the problems of low rates and high complexity.
The basic idea of the PHY security transmission technology is to use the inherent
characteristics of the wireless channel, such as randomness, fading, and interference,
to realize the transmission of confidential information through the signal process-
ing technology. This technology is easier to deploy in practice, so it has attracted
more attention. According to the definition of secrecy capacity, the premise of se-
cure transmission at the physical layer is that the intended recipient’s channel is of
better quality than that of the eavesdropper. However, due to the fading property
of the wireless channel, the intended recipient’s channel does not necessarily have an
advantage. Fortunately, wireless communication resources and signal processing tech-
nologies can be used to create and enhance the advantages of the intended recipient’s
channel, thereby enabling the secure transmission to be achieved.
1.2 Objective and Main Works
This thesis adopts PHY security techniques to ensure the security of wireless
communications. Our objective is to design secure protocols, i.e., protocols based on
secrecy guard zone (SGZ), cooperative jamming (CJ) or artificial noise (AN), and
explore the impacts of secure protocols on network performances. Towards this end,
we first propose the SGZ-based secure protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs with
group-based scheduling scheme and derive the exact secrecy throughput capacity of
the concerned network under the secure protocol. We then design the CJ-based secure
protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs with group-based scheduling scheme and also
study the exact secrecy throughput capacity under the CJ-based secure protocol.
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Finally, we propose secure protocols based on AN and SGZ in continuous MANETs
with Aloha protocol and study the secrecy transmission capacity of the concerned
MANETs. The main works and contributions of this thesis are summarized in the
following subsections.
1.2.1 Secrecy Guard Zone based Secure Protocol in Cell-Partitioned MANETs
This work focuses on the secure protocol design and explores the exact secrecy
throughput capacity of a cell-partitioned MANET [32, 33] with the group-based
scheduling scheme [34–38]. We consider a MANET consisting of multiple legiti-
mate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers moving according to the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) mobility model. We consider a scenario where each
transmitter can detect the existence of eavesdroppers in a region around itself, called
SGZ [39–41] (Please refer to Section 2.1 for related works). It is notable that the idea
of SGZ has been widely adopted as a security-achieving approach in the study of other
security metrics like the secure connectivity [39] and secrecy transmission capacity
[40, 41], which differ, to a large extend, from the secrecy throughput capacity metric
considered in this work.
The secrecy throughput capacity issue is essentially equivalent to the fundamen-
tal and long-standing throughput capacity problem (see [42, 43] and the references
therein) under the consideration of PHY security. This metric characterizes the max-
imum achievable rate per node at which a source packet can be transmitted to the
destination both reliably and securely. Extensive research efforts have been devoted
to the secrecy throughput capacity study of wireless ad hoc network [44–50] (Please
refer to Section 2.4 for related works). It is notable that these works focus on deriving
the scaling law results, which are certainly important to characterize how the secrecy
throughput capacity of a MANET scales up as the network size tends to infinity.
However, as the above scaling law results are usually functions of only the network
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size, they can hardly reflect the impacts of other key parameters of protocols and
schemes on network performances. In addition, scaling law results are usually re-
garded as a retreat when exact results are out of reach [43], which reveals that exact
secrecy throughput capacity results are more deserved and critical to facilitate the
design, development and commercialization of MANETs. The main contributions of
this work can be summarized as follows:
• Based on PHY security technology, we first propose an SGZ-based secure pro-
tocol, in which the transmission of a selected transmitter will be conducted only
if no eavesdroppers exist in its SGZ.
• With the help of the theoretical framework for throughput capacity analysis of
MANETs in [51], we derive exact analytical expression for the secrecy through-
put capacity of the concerned network under the secure protocol, based on
the analysis of secure (resp. source-destination) transmission probability, i.e.,
the probability that a secure (resp. source-destination) transmission can be
conducted between the nodes in a given active cell and the nodes in the trans-
mission range of this cell.
• Finally, extensive simulation results are provided to validate our theoretical
analysis and numerical results are also presented to illustrate the impacts of the
SGZ-based secure protocol on the secrecy throughput capacity performance.
1.2.2 Cooperative Jamming based Secure Protocol in Cell-Partitioned
MANETs
This work focuses on the CJ design of cell-partitioned MANETs. Existing works
regarding the CJ scheme design have been reported in [52–55] (Please refer to Section
2.2 for related works). These works indicated that CJ can be used to improve the
secrecy rate. Thus, this work focuses on the CJ protocol design to further explore
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the exact secrecy throughput capacity of MANETs. The network consists of multiple
legitimate nodes and multiple passive and non-colluding eavesdroppers. And each
node (both legitimate node and eavesdroppers) moves around in the network accord-
ing to the i.i.d. mobility model. We consider a scenario where each transmitter can
know the exact locations of eavesdroppers in its transmission range [56]. Note that
the above assumption on the knowledge about the eavesdropper locations is reason-
able, as a passive eavesdropper can be detected and located from the local oscillator
power leaked from its RF front-end [57, 58]. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows.
• This work proposes a CJ-based secure transmission protocol to ensure the PHY
security based secure communication between the transmitter and receiver. The
CJ-based secure protocol allows non-transmitting legitimate nodes to send ar-
tificial noise to suppress eavesdroppers in the same cell. The transmission of a
selected transmitter will be conducted only if all eavesdroppers in the transmis-
sion range of the transmitter are suppressed.
• The secrecy throughput capacity is adopted to model the security performance
of the proposed secure protocol. For the modeling of this performance metric,
we first conduct analysis on the secure (resp. source-destination) transmission
probability, i.e., the probability that a secure (resp. source-destination) trans-
mission can be conducted between the nodes in a given active cell and the nodes
in the transmission range of this cell. With the help of the theoretical framework
for throughput capacity analysis of MANETs in [51], we derive exact analytical
expression for the secrecy throughput capacity of the concerned network.
• Finally, extensive simulation and numerical results are provided to verify our
theoretical analysis and also to illustrate the secrecy throughput capacity per-
formance of the network. Besides, we compare the SGZ-based secure protocol
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in our first work with the CJ-based secure protocol in terms of the secrecy
throughput capacity.
1.2.3 Secure Protocols based on Artificial Noise and Secrecy Guard Zone
in Continuous MANETs
For continuous MANETs, the authors in [40] studied the secrecy transmission ca-
pacity of MANETs under the conventional Aloha transmission protocol. The secrecy
transmission capacity results were derived under the assumption that the distances
between transmitters and their receivers are fixed, which is difficult to realize in
highly dynamic MANETs. Based on this observation, the authors in [59] considered
MANETs with random transmitter-receiver distances and derived the secrecy trans-
mission capacity results as well. Like [59], the authors also adopted Aloha as the
transmission protocol, while they ignored the crucial issue of protecting the trans-
missions from eavesdropping. To address this issue, this work therefore combines two
widely-used PHY security schemes, i.e., AN injection [60–63] (Please refer to Section
2.3 for related works)and SGZ [39–41] (Please refer to Section 2.1 for related works),
with the Aloha protocol to propose novel secure Aloha transmission protocols and
then analyze the secrecy transmission capacity performance of MANETs under the
newly proposed protocols.
We consider a continuous MANET consisting of multiple legitimate nodes and
multiple eavesdroppers distributed according to two independent and homogeneous
Poisson Point Processes (PPP), respectively. We adopt the Aloha protocol to schedule
transmissions. To protect the transmissions of the legitimate transmitters, we propose
two secure Aloha protocols, which combine commonly-used security schemes and the
conventional Aloha protocol. The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows.
• We propose two secure Aloha protocols, i.e., AN-based protocol and SGZ-based
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protocol, which implement commonly-used PHY security schemes on top of the
conventional Aloha protocol to ensure secure transmissions of transmitters. In
the AN-based protocol, all potential transmitters (i.e., transmitters scheduled
by the conventional Aloha protocol) are allowed to be active and each active
transmitter injects AN into its transmitted signals to confuse eavesdroppers.
In the SGZ-based protocol, each potential transmitter has an SGZ, a circle
centered at itself, and only the potential transmitters whose SGZ contains no
eavesdroppers are allowed to be active.
• Using the tools from Stochastic Geometry, we derive analytical expressions for
the connection outage probability (COP) as well as the upper and lower bounds
on the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the considered network under both
the AN-based protocol and SGZ-based protocol. Based on the COP and SOP,
we then derive the secrecy transmission capacity of the network under both
protocols.
• Finally, extensive simulation and numerical results are provided to validate our
theoretical analysis, and also to show the impacts of key network parameters on
the COP, SOP and secrecy transmission capacity performances of the network.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the re-
lated works of this thesis. In Chapter III, we introduce our work regarding SGZ-based
secure protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs with group-based scheduling scheme.
Chapter IV presents the work on CJ-based secure protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs
with group-based scheduling scheme and Chapter V introduces the work regarding
secure protocols based on AN and SGZ in continuous MANETs. Finally, we conclude
this thesis in Chapter VI.
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1.4 Notations
The main notations of this thesis are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Main notations
Symbol Definition
n number of legitimate nodes
m number of eavesdroppers
M cell-partitioned parameter
g secrecy guard zone size in the cell-partitioned MANET
λ average packet input rate
µ secrecy throughput capacity
D average packet delay
v transmission range of a legitimate node
r spatial multiplexing parameter
∆ guard factor
⌈.⌉ ceiling function
S(j, k) Stirling numbers of the second kind
E[·] expectation operator
P[·] probability operator
ΨL Poisson Point Process (PPP) of legitimate nodes
ΨE PPP of eavesdroppers
ΨT , ΨR Sets of transmitter and receiver locations, resp.
λL, λE density of ΨL and ΨE, resp.
λT , λR density of ΨT and ΨR, resp.
λAT density of active transmitters
SINRj signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the receiver j
10
SINRe SINR at the eavesdropper e
Pco connection outage probability (COP)
PANco COP under the AN-based Aloha protocol
P SGZco COP under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol
Pso secrecy outage probability (SOP)
PANso SOP under the AN-based Aloha protocol
P SGZso SOP under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol
σ COP constraint
ε SOP constraint
βt, βe SINR thresholds for legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, resp.
Rt, Rs codewords rate and secrecy rate, resp.
Re rate loss for securing the message against eavesdropping
Rmaxt maximum allowable coderate Rt
Rmine minimum allowable Re
Tc secrecy transmission capacity
TANc secrecy transmission capacity under the AN-based protocol
T SGZc secrecy transmission capacity under the SGZ-based protocol
p transmission probability
α path-loss exponent
Wr noise power at legitimate receivers
We noise power at eavesdroppers
P total transmission power of the transmitter
τ power allocation parameter
D radius of secrecy guard zone in the continuous MANET
Hij channel fading between nodes i and j





This section introduces the existing works related to our study in this thesis,
including the works on the secrecy guard zone, the works on the cooperative jamming,
the works on the artificial noise and the works on the scaling law results of secrecy
throughput capacity.
2.1 Secrecy Guard Zone
The idea of secrecy guard zone (SGZ) has been applied in wireless networks. Pinto
et al. [39] considered a scenario where each legitimate node can inspect and deactivate
the eavesdroppers falling inside its surrounding area, called SGZ. To improve the
secure connectivity, they applied an SGZ around each legitimate node and proposed
the transmission protocol, in which each legitimate node guarantees the absence of
eavesdroppers in its SGZ (e.g., by deactivating such eavesdroppers). To improve
the secrecy transmission capacity, Zhou et al. [40] applied an SGZ around each
legitimate transmitter and proposed the transmission protocol for networks in which
each legitimate transmitter is able to detect the existence of eavesdroppers in its SGZ.
Transmissions of confidential messages take place only if no eavesdroppers are found
inside the SGZ of the corresponding transmitter. The SGZ was also exploited to
improve the secrecy transmission capacity in random cognitive radio networks in [41].
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It is notable that the idea of SGZ has been widely adopted as a security-achieving
approach in the study of other security metrics like the secure connectivity and secrecy
transmission capacity, which differ, to a large extend, from the secrecy throughput
capacity metric considered in this work.
2.2 Cooperative Jamming
For the cooperative jamming (CJ) technology, relay nodes can be used as helper
nodes to provide jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers, thereby improving the
security of wireless transmission. CJ schemes have been designed in [52, 53] for the
single antenna relay system and in [54, 55] for the multiple antennas relay system.
For the CJ scheme study in the case of a single antenna relay, the authors in [52]
considered the CJ scheme, where the source is transmitting, and the cooperating
nodes transmit weighted noise to confound the eavesdropper. Under the CJ scheme,
they investigated the maximization of the achievable secrecy rate subject to a total
power constraint and the minimization of the total transmit power under a secrecy
rate constraint. In [53], authors used the CJ to achieve the positive secrecy rate for
the single antenna relay system by a combination of convex optimization and a one-
dimensional search. For the CJ scheme study in the case of a multiple antenna relay,
authors in [54] proposed a generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based
CJ scheme for the transmission of multiple data streams to improve the secrecy rate.
The scenario where the relay is equipped with multiple antennas is also considered in
[55]. They designed the CJ protocol for achieving the following two objectives, one
is the secrecy rate maximization subject to a total power constraint, and the other is
the transmit power minimization subject to a secrecy rate constraint. The difference
between the above works and this thesis is that the jamming signals in this thesis
interfere with legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, while the jamming signals in above
works interfere only with eavesdroppers.
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2.3 Artificial Noise
The basic idea of artificial noise (AN) is that the transmitter can use some of
the available power to transmit artificial noise. Since this noise is generated by the
transmitter, the transmitter can design it such that only the eavesdroppers channel
is degraded. Some recent efforts have been devoted to the AN design of wireless
networks. Two schemes for generating AN to achieve secrecy were presented in [60].
In the first scheme, the transmitter can use the multiple antennas to generate the AN
intelligently such that it degrades only the eavesdroppers channel. For the scenario
where transmitter does not have multiple transmit antennas, authors in [60] proposed
the second scheme. The helper nodes simulate the effect of multiple antennas and
allow the transmitter to generate AN as in the first scheme. The multiple antenna
AN scheme was further analyzed in [61, 62], where the MIMO secrecy capacity with
the use of AN was explored. In the design of AN scheme, authors in [63] considered
the transmit power allocation strategy, which has not been investigated in [61, 62].
The above works considered that there was only one transmitter-receiver pair in the
network, while multiple transmitter-receiver pairs were considered in our work.
2.4 Scaling Law Results of Secrecy Throughput Capacity
Some scaling law results on the network secrecy throughput capacity have been
reported in [44–47] for static ad hoc networks and in [48–50] for MANETs. For the
secrecy throughput capacity study in static ad hoc networks, the authors in [44] ex-
plored the secrecy throughput capacity of a Poisson network with legitimate nodes
and eavesdroppers distributed according to Poisson Point Processes. The authors
assumed that the locations of eavesdroppers are known and applied the SGZ to guar-
antee secure transmissions of legitimate transmitters. In addition, the authors also
investigated the secrecy throughput capacity of an arbitrary network with multiple
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legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. The secrecy throughput capacity of a Poisson
network was also studied in [45], while, different from [44], the authors assumed that
the locations of eavesdroppers are unknown and each receiver has two extra antennas
for generating AN to suppress eavesdroppers. This work was later extended in [46]
by introducing social relationships among legitimate network nodes. For a stochastic
network with eavesdroppers of unknown location, the authors in [47] investigated the
trade-off between the network throughput and the maximum number of eavesdrop-
pers that can be tolerated by the network. Similar to [45] and [46], the authors in [47]
adopted the AN generation technique to improve security, while the difference is that
the AN is generated from other helper nodes instead of extra antennas of receivers.
For the secrecy throughput capacity study in MANETs, the authors in [48] studied
the scaling law results of delay-constrained secrecy throughput capacity of a MANET
under both passive attack where eavesdroppers only overhear legitimate transmissions
without actively sending signals and active attack where eavesdroppers actively attack
legitimate transmissions by injecting jamming signals. The results in [48] showed
that the presence of eavesdroppers has a significant impact on the network secrecy
throughput capacity and in general the secrecy throughput capacity under active
attack is less than the secrecy throughput capacity under passive attack. In [49],
the scaling law result of delay-constrained MANET secrecy throughput capacity was
also investigated, while the authors considered static and passive eavesdroppers, and
adopted the AN generation technique in [45] and [46] to suppress the eavesdroppers.
The scaling law result of delay-constrained secrecy throughput capacity in MANETs
with passive eavesdroppers under various routing policies such as Spray-and-Wait was
examined in [50]. The significant difference between the above works and this thesis
is that this thesis derived the exact secrecy throughput capacity of MANETs while
the above works focused on the secrecy throughput capacity scaling laws.
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CHAPTER III
Secrecy Guard Zone based Secure Protocol in
Cell-Partitioned MANETs
In this chapter, we focus on the secrecy guard zone (SGZ) design in cell-partitioned
MANETs, for which we propose an SGZ-based secure protocol to ensure the security
of a finite network with multiple legitimate nodes and multiple passive and non-
colluding eavesdroppers. To evaluate the performance of the proposed secure protocol,
we derive exact analytical expression for the secrecy throughput capacity performance
of the concerned network based on the analysis of two basic secure transmission
probabilities. Extensive simulation and numerical results are provided to demonstrate
the validity of the theoretical analysis as well as to illustrate the performances of the
proposed SGZ-based secure protocol.
3.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 3.1, we consider a torus network with unit area [35, 36, 64],
and the network is evenly partitioned into M × M cells. The network consists of
n legitimate nodes and m passive and non-colluding eavesdroppers. We consider a
time-slotted system and each node (both legitimate node and eavesdroppers) moves
around in the network according to the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a cell partitioned MANET: the circle represents legitimate
node, the cross represents eavesdropper and the arrow represents the mov-
ing direction of nodes.
mobility model [32, 42, 65]. In this model, each node randomly and independently
moves into a cell at the beginning of each time slot and stays in this cell during the
whole slot. We assume that all legitimate nodes occupy the same wireless channel
and have the same transmission range. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the transmission
range of a legitimate node (say S) covers a set of cells (called coverage cells) with
horizontal or vertical distance of no more than v−1 cells away from the cell containing
S, where 1 ≤ v < ⌊M+1
2
⌋ and ⌊.⌋ is the floor function. We assume that n is even and
the traffic flow follows the permutation model [66, 67], where the source-destination
pairs are determined as 1 ↔ 2, 3 ↔ 4, · · · , (n − 1) ↔ n, i.e., each legitimate node is
the source of a traffic flow and at the same time the destination of another traffic flow.
Each source node i is assumed to generate local packets according to an i.i.d. process
Ai(t), which represents the number of generated packets of source node i at time slot
t. It is assumed that Ai(t) has a constant mean λ (i.e., E{Ai(t)} = λ) and a bounded
second moment A2max (i.e., E{A2i (t)} ≤ A2max < ∞), where E{} is the expectation
operator. This represents that all source nodes have the same average packet input
rate λ packets/slot. To coordinate the simultaneous transmission of source nodes, we
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Figure 3.2: Group-based scheduling.
adopt the widely-used group-based scheduling scheme [34–38]. This scheme divides
all the network cells into r2 groups with each group consisting of K = ⌊M2/r2⌋
cells and becoming active (i.e., allowed to transmit packets) alternately in every r2
time slots. As shown in Figure 3.2, the distance between any two horizontally (or
vertically) adjacent cells in the same group is of r cells, and r is given by
r = min{⌈(1 + ∆)
√
2v + v⌉,M}, (3.1)
where ⌈.⌉ is the ceiling function and ∆ is a guard factor to prevent interference from
other concurrent transmitters in the same group. We refer to the cells of the active
group in the current time slot as active cells throughout this thesis.
3.2 Secrecy Guard Zone based Secure Protocol
We consider a scenario in this chapter regarding the knowledge of legitimate nodes
about the eavesdroppers. In this scenario, we assume that each transmitter can detect
the existence of eavesdroppers in a region around itself, called secrecy guard zone
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Figure 3.3: SGZ-based secure protocol.
(SGZ) [39–41, 68]. As shown in Figure 3.3, we model the SGZ of a transmitter (say
S) as a square region with g cells centered at the cell containing S. To ensure secure
transmission in this scenario, we propose an SGZ-based secure protocol, in which the
transmission of a selected transmitter can be conducted only if no eavesdroppers exist
in the SGZ, and suspended otherwise.
3.3 Exact Secrecy Throughput Capacity Analysis
In this section, we derive the exact secrecy throughput capacity under the SGZ-
based secure protocol. Similar to [69, 70] the word exact is used to emphasize that
the results derived in this thesis are closed-form expressions rather than order-sense
or scaling-law expressions, and that the results are also exact ones rather than upper
or lower bounds. We first give the formal definition of secrecy throughput capacity
as follows.
Secrecy Throughput Capacity: Consider a cell-partitioned MANET under
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the group-based scheduling and the proposed secure protocol, the secrecy throughput
capacity is defined as the maximum input rate λ (packets/slot) that the network can
support stably and securely. The term stably means that for a given input rate λ, we
can find a packet delivery algorithm to ensure that the average delay of the network
is bounded. The term securely means that all transmissions are secure against the
eavesdroppers under the proposed secure transmission protocols.
Notice that the secrecy throughput capacity characterizes the fundamental limit
on the achievable end-to-end secrecy throughput per source-destination pair of the
considered system.
3.3.1 Secrecy Throughput Capacity Analysis Framework
The secrecy throughput capacity analysis in this work is based on the theoretical
framework in [51]. Following this framework, we first need to derive an upper bound
µ on the secrecy throughput capacity, and then prove this upper bound is achievable,
which means that for any input rate λ < µ, the network is stable, i.e., the average
packet delay D is bounded, under a given packet delivery algorithm.
The derivation of the upper bound µ is based on the fact that the total output
rate of packets must be less than the total input rate to stabilize the network. When
the total output rate is arbitrarily close to the total input rate, we can obtain µ.
Consider a time interval [0, T ], it is easy to see that the average number of input
packets into the network is nλT . To see the average number of output packets,
we define p0 (p1) the probability that a (source-destination) transmission can be
securely conducted between the nodes in a given active cell c and the nodes in the
coverage cells of c. According to the group-based scheduling, there are K active cells
in each time slot. Thus, during T time slots, the average number of secure (source-
destination) transmission opportunities is Kp0T (Kp1T ). In order to deliver as many
packets as possible during the T time slots, we use the Kp1T source-destination
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secure transmission opportunities to deliver Kp1T packets. Since the other packets
must traverse at least two hops to reach their destinations, which means that at
least two transmission opportunities are consumed for each packet, the remaining
Kp0T−Kp1T opportunities can be used to deliver at most (Kp0T−Kp1T )/2 packets.
Thus, the total number of output packets during T time slots is no more than Kp1T+
(Kp0T −Kp1T )/2. To stabilize the network, there should exist sufficiently larger T
such that the difference between the total input rate nλ and the total output rate
Kp1 + (Kp0 −Kp1)/2 should be within an arbitrarily small ϵ > 0, that is
nλ− [Kp1 + (Kp0 −Kp1)/2] ≤ ϵ, (3.2)
or equivalently






When ϵ is arbitrarily small, we can derive the upper bound µ as
µ =
K (p0 + p1)
2n
. (3.4)
Next, we prove that for any input rate λ < µ, the average packet delay D of the
network is bounded. According to [51], with probabilities p0 and p1, we can bound




where ρ = λ
µ
denotes the system load,
B0 = (nA
2
max +K − 2Kλ)(p20 − p21) + 2nµ(p0 + np1 − p1), (3.6)
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and
B1 = 4(p0 + np1 − p1)(p0 − p1). (3.7)
Therefore, according to the above, the upper bound µ is the exact secrecy throughput
capacity.
3.3.2 Exact Secrecy Throughput Capacity Result
We present the following theorem regarding the exact secrecy throughput capacity
result.
Theorem III.1 Consider a cell-partitioned network with n legitimate nodes, m eaves-
droppers and M2 cells, where nodes move according to i.i.d. mobility model, the
group-based scheduling is adopted to coordinate simultaneous link transmission and
the SGZ-based secure protocol is utilized to ensure secure transmissions, the exact








2M2n − (M2 − 1)n





where g denotes the size of the SGZ and β = (2v−1)2 denotes the size of transmission
range.
Proof 1 According to the framework in Section 3.3.1, we only need to derive p0 and
p1 to obtain the secrecy throughput capacity. We focus on a given active cell c and
derive p0 as the first step. First, we calculate the probability that the transmission is
on, which is equivalent to the probability that there are no eavesdroppers in the SGZ
of c, i.e., (1 − g
M2
)m. Next, we define p̂0 the probability that there are at least two
legitimate nodes existing in the coverage cells of c and at least one of those nodes is
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M2n − (M2 − 1)n − n(M2 − β)n−1
]
. (3.9)








M2n − (M2 − 1)n − n(M2 − β)n−1
]
. (3.10)
The second step is to derive p1. We define p̂1 the probability that there are at least
one source-destination pair in the coverage cells of c and at least one node of such























After deriving p0 and p1, the exact secrecy throughput capacity in (3.8) then follows
according to (3.4).
3.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we first provide simulation results to validate our theoretical anal-
ysis for the secrecy throughput capacity performance of the concerned network. We
then explore how the secrecy throughput capacity performance varies with the pa-
rameters of the proposed SGZ-based secure protocol.
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3.4.1 Model Validation
To validate our secrecy throughput capacity analysis, a dedicated C++ simulator
was developed to simulate the packet delivery process in the concerned MANET under
the proposed SGZ-based secure protocol, which is now available at [71]. According
to secrecy throughput capacity framework in Section 3.3.1, we conduct extensive
simulations to calculate the simulated results of the average packet delay for our
secrecy throughput capacity analysis validation. Similar to [71], in the simulation, we
fix the guard factor as ∆ = 1 and focus the packet delivery process of a given source-
destination pair during 107 time slots. The expected packet delay in the simulation
is calculated as the ratio of the total delay of all packets delivered to the destination
in 107 time slots to the number of these packets.
For the SGZ-based secure protocol, v is fixed as v = 1 and hence r is determined
as r = 4. We conduct simulations under the network scenarios of (n = 100, M =
8, m = 5, g = 9) and (n = 100, M = 8, m = 10, g = 9), respectively. The
simulation results of the average packet delay and the corresponding theoretical ones
are summarized in Figure 3.4. We can see from Figure 3.4 that for any input rate
λ < µ (i.e., system load ρ < 1), the average packet delay D of the network can be
bounded by our theoretical delay upper bound in (3.5) under both network scenarios,
which implies that the network is always stable whenever λ < µ. Another observation
from Figure 3.4 indicates that when the system load ρ approaches 1, i.e., the input rate
λ is infinitely close to the secrecy throughput capacity µ, the expected packet delay
increases drastically. According to the framework in Section 3.3.1, these two behaviors
indicate that our theoretical secrecy throughput capacity result under the SGZ-based
secure protocol is efficient to exactly model the network secrecy throughput capacity
performance of the concerned network.
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bound for i.i.d. mobility
i.i.d. simulation
v= 100,n M m g= 1, = 8, = 5, = 9
(a) Average packet delay vs. system load under network scenario of n = 100, v = 1,
M = 8, m = 5, g = 9.

































bound for i.i.d. mobility
i.i.d. simulation
n = 100, v = 1, M = 8, m = 10, g = 9
(b) Average packet delay vs. system load under network scenario of n = 100, v = 1,
M = 8, m = 10, g = 9.
Figure 3.4: Model validation under SGZ-based secure protocol.
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3.4.2 Performance Discussion
With the help of our theoretical results, we now explore how the secrecy through-
put capacity µ varies with the network parameters. We examine the impacts of the
number of eavesdroppers m and the SGZ size g upon the secrecy throughput capacity
µ. For the fixed setting of (n = 100,M = 8, v = 1), we show in Figure 3.5 the rela-
tionship between µ and m under three different settings of g = 1, g = 9 and g = 25.
We can see from Figure 3.5 that as m increases, the secrecy throughput capacity µ
decreases. This is intuitive since as more eavesdroppers are located in the network,
the probability that there exist eavesdroppers within the SGZ of an active transmitter
increases, resulting in decreased secure transmission probabilities p0 and p1. It can
also be seen from Figure 3.5 that a larger SGZ leads to a decreased secrecy through-
put capacity, which is because that as the SGZ size increases, more eavesdroppers
will appear in the SGZ and thus the secure transmission probabilities p0 and p1 will
decrease.
3.5 Summary
This chapter studied the secrecy guard zone (SGZ) design of a cell-partitioned
MANET with the group-based scheduling scheme. We first proposed SGZ-based se-
cure protocol, in which the transmission of a selected transmitter will be conducted
only if no eavesdroppers exist in its SGZ. We then derived analytical expression for
the exact secrecy throughput capacity of the concerned MANET under the secure
protocol. Finally, we provide simulation and numerical results to illustrate the ef-
ficiency of our secrecy throughput capacity analysis as well the secrecy throughput
capacity performance of the network. The results indicated that SGZ is an effective
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Figure 3.5: Secrecy throughput capacity µ vs. the number of eavesdroppers m for
varying SGZ size g.
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CHAPTER IV
Cooperative Jamming based Secure Protocol in
Cell-Partitioned MANETs
This chapter focuses on the cooperative jamming (CJ) design in cell-partitioned
MANETs, for which we propose a CJ-based secure protocol to ensure the security of
a finite network with multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers moving
according to the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) mobility model. We
then theoretically analyze two secure transmission probabilities and exact secrecy
throughput capacity of the network under the CJ-based secure protocol. Finally,
extensive simulation and numerical results are presented to validate our theoretical
analysis and also to illustrate the impacts of the CJ-based secure protocol on the
secrecy throughput capacity performance.
4.1 System Model
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, we consider that the wireless network is a square
partitioned into M × M cells. The network consists of n legitimate nodes and m
eavesdroppers. We adopt the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) mobil-
ity model, where each legitimate node or eavesdropper independently moves into a
cell at the beginning of each time slot and stays in it during the whole slot. The
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Figure 4.1: System Model: the circle represents legitimate node, the cross represents
eavesdropper. All shaded cells mean that they are in the same group.
transmission range of each transmitter can be adjusted to cover a set of cells (called
coverage cells) with horizontal and vertical distance of no more than v− 1 cells away
from the cell containing the transmitter, where 1 ≤ v < ⌊M+1
2
⌋ and ⌊.⌋ is the floor
function. We assume that the traffic flow follows the permutation model, where the
source-destination pairs are determined as 1 ↔ 2, 3 ↔ 4, · · · , (n − 1) ↔ n, i.e.,
each legitimate node is the source of a traffic flow and at the same time the destina-
tion of another traffic flow. We first define the λ as the average input rate. Then,
let Ai(t) represent the number of generating packets for any legitimate transmitter
i at time t. We assume E{Ai(t)} = λ and a bounded second moment A2max fol-
lows E{A2i (t)} ≤ A2max < ∞, where E{} is the expectation operator. We adopt the
widely-used group-based scheduling to coordinate the simultaneous transmission for
eliminating interference. In this scheduling, all cells of the network are divided into
r2 groups. Each group consists of K = ⌊M2/r2⌋ cells and becomes active to transmit
data every r2 time slots. The cells in the current active group are called active cells
throughout the thesis. In the same group, the distance between any two horizontally
(or vertically) adjacent cells is of r cells, as shown in Figure 4.1. In addition, r can
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be determined as
r = min{⌈(1 + ∆)
√
2v + v⌉,M}, (4.1)
where ⌈.⌉ is the ceiling function and ∆ is a guard factor to prevent interference
between transmitters and receivers.
4.2 Cooperative Jamming based Secure Protocol
We consider a new scenario where each transmitter can know the exact location
of each eavesdropper in its transmission range. To ensure secure transmission in this
scenario, we propose a cooperative jamming (CJ) based secure protocol [55, 72], in
which we use non-transmitting legitimate nodes (say jammers) in the same cell of an
eavesdropper to generate artificial noise, such that the eavesdroppers cannot intercept
any information, as shown in Figure 4.2. We assume the other legitimate nodes in
the same cell cannot correctly receive packets as well due to the heavy interference
from jammers. Thus, the transmission of the selected transmitter can be conducted
only if each eavesdropper in its transmission range is suppressed by the jammers in
the same cell.
4.3 Exact Secrecy Throughput Capacity Analysis
In this section, we first need to derive the probability p0 that a transmission can
be securely conducted between a given active cell c and the coverage cells of c and also
the probability p1 that a source-destination transmission can be securely conducted









Figure 4.2: CJ-based secure protocol.
Lemma 1 For the concerned cell-partitioned MANET with the CJ-based secure pro-
tocol, the probability p0 that a transmission can be securely conducted between the
nodes in a given active cell c and the nodes in the coverage cells of c is given by







Proof 2 We divide the derivation of p0 into two cases, i.e., the first case where the
active cell c contains eavesdroppers and the second case where c does not contain
eavesdroppers.
For the first case, we first discuss the distribution of eavesdroppers in the trans-
mission range of c. We use Ak (1 ≤ k ≤ β) to denote the event that there are k
cells containing eavesdroppers (say eavesdropped cells) in the transmission range. To
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The probability that these j eavesdroppers are exactly located in the k eavesdropped




where S(j, k) is the Stirling numbers of the second kind and the term Ck−1β−1 is due to
the fact that we only need to select k− 1 cells from the β− 1 cells of the transmission
range, provided that the active cell c is an eavesdropped cell. Thus, applying the law
of total probability, we can determine the probability of Ak as the Ψ1(k) in (4.3).
We then discuss the distribution of legitimate nodes in the transmission range of
c such that the transmission can be securely conducted given the event Ak. We first
consider the event that there are 0 ≤ i ≤ n legitimate nodes in the transmission range
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Next, we assume that l out of the i nodes are located in the k eavesdropped cells. To
ensure secure transmission, the distribution of legitimate nodes in the transmission
range must satisfy the following conditions:
a) i ≥ k + 2;
b) the active cell c contains at least two legitimate nodes, one for jamming eaves-
droppers and the other for sending packets;
c) each of the other k − 1 eavesdropped cells must contain at least one legitimate
node for jamming eavesdroppers;
d) there exists at least one legitimate node in the other β − k cells for receiving
packets (i.e., l ≤ i− 1).
Base on conditions b) and c), we have l ≥ k + 1. Thus, the probability of secure










where the term Q is for ensuring condition b) and c). Thus, applying the law of total
probability, the secure transmission probability under the event Ak is the Ω1(k) in
(4.4).
Applying the law of total probability in terms of Ak, we determine the probability





Now, we consider the case where the active cell c does not contain eavesdroppers,
i.e., c is not an eavesdropped cell. Thus, we need to select k (0 ≤ k ≤ β − 1) cells
from the β − 1 cells of the transmission range as the eavesdropped cells. Thus, the
probability of Ak can be determined as the Ψ2(k) in (4.5).
Given that there are 0 ≤ i ≤ n legitimate nodes in the transmission range, in this
case, the conditions for secure transmission become as follows:
i) i ≥ k + 2;
ii) each of the k eavesdropped cell must contain at least one legitimate node;
iii) there exist at least two legitimate nodes in the other β− k cells and at least one
of these nodes is in the active cell c.
Thus, assuming l out of the i nodes are located in the k eavesdropped cells and defining
d the number of legitimate nodes in the active cell, the secure transmission probability
under event Ak is the Ω2(k) in (4.6).
Applying the law of total probability in terms of Ak, we determine the probability




Finally, combining the results in (4.11) and (4.12) yields the p0 in (4.2).
Lemma 2 For the concerned cell-partitioned MANET with the CJ-based secure pro-
tocol, the probability p1 that a source-destination transmission can be securely con-
ducted between the nodes in a given active cell c and the nodes in the coverage cells
of c is given by
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Proof 3 Similar to the proof of p0, the proof of p1 is also divided into two cases de-
pending on whether c is an eavesdropped cell or not. Notice that, for both cases, the
distributions of eavesdroppers in the transmission range of c (i.e., Ψ1(k) and Ψ2(k))
are same to those in the derivation of p0. Thus, we only discuss the distribution of le-
gitimate nodes such that the source-destination transmission can be securely conducted
for a given number of eavesdropped cells (i.e., the event Ak).
For the first case where c is an eavesdropped cell, we consider an event that there
are 0 ≤ i ≤ n legitimate nodes in the transmission range of c and these i nodes
contain t source-destination pairs, where 0 ≤ t ≤ ⌊i/2⌋. The probability of this event















Under this event, we calculate the secure source-destination transmission probability.
In addition to the conditions a) – d) for a secure communication in the derivation of
p0, another critical condition for a secure source-destination transmission is that the
transmission must be conducted between one of the t source-destination pairs, which
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makes the calculation of p1 highly complex.
We still assume l out of the i nodes are located in the k eavesdropped cells. Ac-
cording to the locations of the two nodes in a source-destination pair, we classify the t
source-destination pairs into four categories: 1) one node is located in the active cell
and the other is located in the β− k non-eavesdropped cells; 2) both nodes are located
in the k eavesdropped cells; 3) one node is located in the other k−1 eavesdropped cells
except for the active cell c and the other is located in the β−k non-eavesdropped cells;
and 4) both nodes are located in the β − k non-eavesdropped cells. We use t1, t2 and
t3 to denote the number of source-destination pairs of the categories 1), 2) and 3),
respectively. Obviously, t1+ t2+ t3 ≤ t and l ≥ t1+2t2+ t3. Notice that the remaining
l − (t1 + 2t2 + t3) nodes in the k eavesdropped cells are selected from the other i− 2t
unpaired nodes in the transmission range. Next, we use s to denote the number of
nodes in the active cell except for the t1 nodes. Notice that these s nodes are selected
from the l − t1 − t3 nodes. Now, we have s + t1 nodes in the active cell, l − (s + t1)
nodes in the other k − 1 eavesdropped cells and i − l in the β − k non-eavesdropped
cells. Based on these definitions and assumptions, in order to ensure a secure source-
destination transmission, we must have s+ t1 ≥ 2 (condition b)), l− (s+ t1) ≥ k− 1
(condition c)), l ≤ i− 1 (condition d)) and an additional condition t1 ≥ 1. Thus, the


















t3C l−t1−2t2−t3i−2t , (4.17)
where the term Y is to satisfy the condition c). Thus, applying the law of total
37
probability, the probability p1 in the first case under the event Ak is the Φ1(k) in
(4.14). We then apply the law of total probability in terms of Ak to determine the




Now, we consider the second case where the active cell c does not contain eaves-
droppers, i.e., c is not an eavesdropped cell. We use t4 and t5 to denote the number
of source-destination pairs where both nodes are in the β − k non-eavesdropped cells
(i.e., category 4) ) and the number of source-destination pairs where one node is in
the k eavesdropped cells and the other is in the β − k non-eavesdropped cells (i.e.,
categories 1) and 3) ), respectively. In addition, we use t6 to denote the number of
source-destination pairs where one node is in the active cell and the other is in the
β−k non-eavesdropped cells. Notice that these t6 pairs can be used for secure source-
destination transmissions. Obviously, t6 ≤ t4 and there are 1 + 2(β − k − 1) (resp.
(β − k − 1)2) kinds of distributions for each of the t6 (resp. t4 − t6) pairs. Again, we
assume i nodes are located in the transmission range of the active cell c and l out of
the i nodes are located in the k eavesdropped cells. Based on the conditions i)—iii)
in the derivation of p0 under the second case and an additional condition t6 ≥ 1, the
probability p1 under the event Ak in the second case is given by the Φ2(k) in (4.15).
Applying the law of total probability in terms of Ak, we determine the probability p1




Finally, combining the results in (4.18) and (4.19) yields the p1 in (4.13).
Based on p0 and p1, we can give the exact secrecy throughput capacity for the
concerned network under the CJ-based secure protocol in the following theorem.
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Theorem IV.1 Consider a cell-partitioned network with n legitimate nodes, m eaves-
droppers and M2 cells, where nodes move according to i.i.d. mobility model, the
group-based scheduling is adopted to coordinate simultaneous link transmission and
the CJ-based secure protocol is utilized to ensure secure transmissions, the exact se-










Ψ1(k)Ω1(k) + Ψ2(k)Ω2(k) + Ψ1(k)Φ1(k) + Ψ2(k)Φ2(k)
]}
, (4.20)
where Ψ1, Ψ2 are given by (4.3) and (4.5), Ω1, Ω2 are given by (4.4) and (4.6), and
Φ1, Φ2 are given by (4.14) and (4.15), respectively.
Proof 4 The theorem follows from the proof in Chapter III. The basic idea of the
proof is as follows: first, we prove µ in (4.20) is an upper bound on the secrecy
throughput capacity. Based on p0, p1, during the time slot T, we can get the overall
transmission opportunities Kp0T and the source-destination transmission opportuni-
ties Kp1T . Because the Kp1T opportunities can reach their destinations in only one
top, and the Kp0T −Kp1T opportunities can deliver at most (Kp0T −Kp1T )/2 pack-
ets. For arbitrarily small ϵ > 0, the difference between the total input rate nλ and the
total output rate Kp1 + (Kp0 −Kp1)/2 should be within ϵ, thus, we derive the upper
bound µ. Second, we prove µ is the achievable upper bound. For any input rate λ < µ,
the concerned MANET is stable under the two-hop relay algorithm. Therefore, the
upper bound µ is the exact secrecy throughput capacity. For the details of the proof,
please refer to the secrecy throughput capacity analysis framework in Chapter III.
Remark 1 The results in this work are computed for relatively non-practical models,
which makes them not of significant practical values. Although these results fail to
reflect the actual secrecy throughput capacity performances of networks in the real
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world, they may still be able to provide us some insights on the fundamental trends
of system secrecy throughput capacity performances as some key system parameters
change. Notice that assuming highly academic non-practical models has been one of
the basic research methodologies for network performance evaluation in the literature,
like [73, 74] for network throughput study, [40, 48–50] for network secrecy throughput
study.
4.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we first provide simulation results to validate our theoretical anal-
ysis for the secrecy throughput capacity performance of the concerned network. We
then explore how the secrecy throughput capacity performance varies with the net-
work parameters under the proposed CJ-based secure protocol.
4.4.1 Model Validation
We developed a dedicated C++ simulator to simulate the packet delivery process
in the concerned network under the CJ-based secure protocol, which is now available
at [71]. In the simulation, we fix the guard factor as ∆ = 1 and focus the packet
delivery process of a given source-destination pair during 107 time slots.
For the CJ-based secure protocol, we set v = 2 (hence r = 8) and conduct extensive
simulations under the network scenarios of (n = 100, M = 8, m = 10) and (n = 100,
M = 8, m = 20), respectively. We provide plots of the simulated average packet delay
and the theoretical delay bound in Figure 4.3. Similar behaviors of the average packet
delay versus the system load ρ can be observed from Figure 4.3, which indicates that
our theoretical secrecy throughput capacity result under the CJ-based secure protocol
is also efficient to exactly model the network secrecy throughput capacity performance
of the concerned network.
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bound for i.i.d. mobility
i.i.d. simulation
(a) Average packet delay vs. system load under network scenario of n = 100, v = 2,
M = 8, m = 10.





























bound for i.i.d. mobility
i.i.d. simulation
n = 100, v = 2, M = 8, m = 20
(b) Average packet delay vs. system load under network scenario of n = 100, v = 2,
M = 8, m = 20.
Figure 4.3: Model validation under CJ-based secure protocol.
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4.4.2 Performance Discussion
We investigate the impacts of the number of eavesdroppers m and the side-length
of transmission range v on the secrecy throughput capacity µ. For the fixed setting of
n = 100 and M = 8, Figure 4.4 illustrates how µ varies with m under three different
sizes of transmission range, i.e., v = 2, v = 3 and v = 4. We can observe from
Figure 4.4 that the secrecy throughput capacity decreases as m increases, due to the
reason that more eavesdroppers result in more eavesdropped cells in the transmission
range of an active cell and thus more nodes will be sacrificed for suppressing these
eavesdroppers, reducing the chances for an active cell to schedule two nodes to do
packet (or source-destination packet) transmissions. Another observation from Figure
4.4 shows that, µ decreases as v increases. This can be explained as follows: as v
increases, the size of transmission range increases, which leads to an increase in the
number of eavesdropped cells. Thus, more legitimate nodes are required for secure




































n = 100, = 8M
Figure 4.4: Secrecy throughput capacity µ vs. the number of eavesdroppers m for
varying v under CJ-based secure protocol.
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Finally, we compare the SGZ-based secure protocol in Chapter III with the CJ-
based secure protocol in terms of the secrecy throughput capacity µ. To make these
two protocols comparable, we set the size of SGZ in Chapter III equal to the size of
transmission range, i.e., g = (2v−1)2. Under the setting of n = 100, v = 2,M = 8 and
g = 9, we illustrate in Figure 4.5(a) how the µ varies with m under both protocols.
Under the setting of n = 100,M = 16 and m = 10, we illustrate in Figure 4.5(b) how
the µ varies with v under both protocols. We can see from Figure 4.5 that under the
setting of g = (2v − 1)2, the CJ-based secure protocol can achieve a larger secrecy
throughput capacity µ than the SGZ-based secure protocol. This is because that for
g = (2v − 1)2 if there exists eavesdroppers in the SGZ (i.e., transmission range), the
SGZ-based protocol cannot provide secure transmission opportunities, while the CJ-
based protocol may still be able to ensure secure transmissions by suppressing these
eavesdroppers.
Besides, we explore the impacts of the number of legitimate nodes n on the se-
crecy throughput capacity µ under both protocols. As we can see from Figure 4.6,
there exists an optimal number of legitimate nodes to maximize secrecy throughput
capacity. This can be explained as follows: on the one hand, a greater number of
legitimate nodes will result in more chances for an active cell to schedule two nodes
to do packet transmissions and thus an increase in transmission rates of source nodes,
but on the other hand, a greater number of legitimate nodes will introduce more
significant medium contentions among source nodes and thus a decrease in their
transmission rates. When the former (resp. the latter) factor dominates, secrecy






























Number of eavesdroppers, m
n = 100, v M = 8, g = 9= 2,
SGZ-based secure protocol
CJ-based secure protocol
(a) Secrecy throughput capacity µ vs. the number of eavesdroppers m.
(b) Secrecy throughput capacity µ vs. transmission range v.
Figure 4.5: SGZ-based secure protocol vs. CJ-based secure protocol with guard zone
size g = (2v − 1)2.
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Figure 4.6: Secrecy throughput capacity µ vs. the number of legitimate nodes n
under both secure protocols.
4.5 Summary
This chapter explored the physical layer security-based secure communications in
a finite cell-partitioned MANETs, for which a cooperative jamming (CJ) based secure
protocol is proposed. The CJ-based protocol utilizes non-transmitting nodes to gener-
ate artificial noise to suppress eavesdroppers in the same cell, such that transmissions
can be conducted only if all eavesdroppers in the transmission range are suppressed.
To understand the security performance of the proposed secure protocol, we derived
the exact secrecy throughput capacity result based on the analysis of two basic secure
transmission probabilities. We also compared the SGZ-based secure protocol with the
CJ-based secure protocol in terms of the secrecy throughput capacity. The results in-
dicated that the CJ-based protocol outperforms the SGZ-based protocol with respect





Secure Protocols based on Artificial Noise and
Secrecy Guard Zone in Continuous MANETs
In this chapter, by combining PHY security techniques (e.g., artificial noise injec-
tion and secrecy guard zone) and the conventional Aloha protocol, we first propose
an artificial noise (AN)-based Aloha protocol and a secrecy guard zone (SGZ)-based
Aloha protocol to ensure secure medium access for legitimate transmitters in continu-
ous MANETs. To understand the security performances of the proposed secure Aloha
protocols, we then apply tools from Stochastic Geometry to analyze the secrecy trans-
mission capacity performance of MANETs under both protocols. Finally, we provide
simulation/numerical results to validate our theoretical analysis and also to show the
impacts of network parameters on the secrecy transmission capacity performance of
the concerned network.
5.1 Preliminaries and Secure Protocols
5.1.1 Network Model
We consider a MANET, where the locations of legitimate nodes and eavesdrop-
pers are modeled by independent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes (PPPs)
ΨL and ΨE with densities λL and λE, respectively. We adopt the Aloha protocol
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to schedule transmissions, where each legitimate node becomes a transmitter (resp.
receiver) with probability p (resp. 1− p) in each time slot. Thus, due to the indepen-
dent thinning, the locations of legitimate transmitters can be modeled by a PPP ΨT
with density λT = pλL and those of the legitimate receivers by another independent
PPP ΨR with density λR = (1− p)λL.
To characterize the propagation effects, we consider the quasi-static Rayleigh fad-
ing model, where all channel gains remain constant in one time slot and vary randomly
and independently from slot to slot. Thus, the fading coefficient Hij between nodes i
and j follows the exponential distribution with unit mean. In addition to fading, all
channels are also impaired by path loss and noise. We use α to denote the path loss
exponent and use Wr (resp. We) to denote the noise power at legitimate receivers
(resp. eavesdroppers).
To transmit messages, each transmitter selects the nearest legitimate receiver as its
destination receiver. Regarding the eavesdropping attack, we assume that information
signals from the transmitters will not interfere with the eavesdroppers, which can be
considered as the worst case.
5.1.2 Secure Aloha Protocols
To protect the transmissions of the legitimate transmitters, we propose two secure
Aloha protocols, which combine commonly-used security schemes and the conven-
tional Aloha protocol as described in Section 5.1.1. The first one is based on AN
injection and thus called AN-based protocol. In this protocol, all transmitters be-
come active and each transmits confidential messages and AN simultaneously to its
destination receiver, as shown in Figure 5.1. We assume both the transmitter and re-
ceiver of a transmission pair know the channel state information (CSI) between them
such that the receiver can eliminate the AN, while either the eavesdroppers or the
other receivers cannot. The second one is based on SGZ and thus named SGZ-based
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Figure 5.1: AN-based secure Aloha protocol: the circle represents legitimate node
and the cross represents eavesdropper.
protocol. In this scheme, we assume that each transmitter can detect the existence
of eavesdroppers inside a circle with radius D around it, i.e., the SGZ as shown in
Figure 5.2. Different from the AN-based protocol, in the SGZ-based protocol, only
the transmitters whose SGZ contains no eavesdroppers become active, i.e., transmit
messages.
5.1.3 Performance Metrics
In this chapter, we assume the transmitters adopt the Wyner encoding scheme [17]
when transmitting confidential messages. In this scheme, each confidential message
is associated with multiple symbols, and encoded to one of them at random during
the transmission. Two rates are chosen for each transmission, i.e., one rate Rt to
encode the symbol and one rate Rs to encode the confidential message. The difference
Re = Rt −Rs reflects the cost to confuse the eavesdroppers.
The main performance metric considered in this work is the secrecy transmission
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Figure 5.2: SGZ-based secure Aloha protocol.
capacity, which characterizes the average maximum achievable rate of secure and
reliable transmissions per unit area. To characterize the reliability of a certain trans-
mission, the connection outage probability (COP) is adopted, which is the probability
that the intended receiver fails to decode the transmitted message, i.e., the channel
capacity is less than rate Rt. Denoting the receiver by j, we can formulate the COP
as








where SINRj denotes the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at the re-
ceiver and log is to the base of 2. We can see that the COP is a monotonically
increasing function of Rt.
To characterize the security of the transmission, we adopt the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) metric, which represents the probability that eavesdroppers succeed
in decoding the transmitted messages and can be formulated as
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pso = 1− P
( ∩
e∈ΨE









where SINRe denotes the SINR at eavesdropper e. This definition implies that the
transmission suffers from secrecy outage, i.e, is not secure, if at least one eavesdropper
can decode the transmitted messages. We can see that the SOP is a monotonically
decreasing function of Re.
According to [40], given a COP constraint σ and an SOP constraint ε, i.e.,
pco(Rt) ≤ σ and pso(Re) ≤ ε, we can formulate the secrecy transmission capacity
Tc as
Tc = (1− σ)λAT (Rmaxt −Rmine ), (5.3)
where λAT denotes the density of active transmitters, R
max
t denotes the maximum
allowable coderate Rt and R
min
e denotes the minimum allowable Re. Due to the
monotonicity of pco in terms of Rt, R
max
t can be given by
Rmaxt = log(1 + p
−1
co (σ)). (5.4)
Similarly, Rmine can be given by
Rmine = log(1 + p
−1
so (ε)). (5.5)
5.2 Secrecy Transmission Capacity for Artificial Noise based
Aloha Protocol
This section presents the secrecy transmission capacity analysis for the network
under the AN-based protocol, for which the COP and SOP are derived in Subsections
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5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively. Based on the COP and SOP, the secrecy transmission
capacity is given in Subsection 5.2.3.
5.2.1 COP Analysis
To facilitate the analysis, we focus on a typical transmitter-receiver pair and define
i and j the transmitter and receiver, respectively. The total transmission power of the
transmitter is P , of which a fraction τ (0 < τ < 1) is allocated to message transmission
and the remaining 1− τ fraction is to AN transmission. From the Slivnyak’s theorem
[75], given the location of the typical transmitter, the locations of other transmitters
still follow the PPP with density pλL. Since j receives interference from the other
concurrent transmitters in ΨT\{i}, the SINR of j can be given by
SINRj =
τPHij |Xij|−α∑
k∈ΨT \{i} PHkj |Xkj|
−α +Wr
, (5.6)
where Haj and |Xaj| represent the channel fading and the distance between nodes
a (a ∈ {i, k}) and j, respectively. Wr denotes the background noise power at the
receiver j. Based on the formulation in (5.1), we now derive the COP in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 The COP of any link in the considered MANET under the AN-based Aloha
protocol is












where βt = 2
Rt − 1, θ = πpλLΓ(1− 2/α)Γ(1 + 2/α).
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Proof 5 Based on the definition in (5.1), we have
pANco = P (SINRj < βt)




























































−α is a shot noise process, (a) follows since Hij is
an exponential random variable with unit mean, and (b) follows from the Laplace
transform of I0 in [76].
Since each transmitter chooses the nearest legitimate receiver as the destination
receiver. The distance |Xij| between the typical transmitter i and destination receiver
j is a random variable, whose probability density function (PDF) is given by [77]
f|Xij |(r) = e
−(1−p)λLπr22(1− p)λLπr. (5.9)
Taking the expectation of the last step in (5.8) in terms of |Xij| completes the proof.
5.2.2 SOP Analysis
For the analysis of the SOP, we focus on the typical transmission link i → j again.
Any eavesdropper e targeting this link receives interference from only the AN of the
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transmitters in ΨT . Hence, the SINR at the eavesdropper e is given by
SINRe =
τPHie |Xie|−α
Iie + Iīe +We
, (5.10)
where Hie and |Xie| represent the channel fading and the distance between the trans-
mitter i and the eavesdropper e,
Iie = (1− τ)PHie |Xie|−α





denotes the interference at e from the other concurrent transmitters, and We denotes
the background noise power at e. Based on the formulation in (5.2), we derive the
upper bound on the SOP in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 The upper bound on the SOP of any link in the considered MANET under
the AN-based Aloha protocol is
pAN,UBso = 1− exp
[
− 2πλEτ












where βe = 2
Re − 1, θ = πpλLΓ(1− 2/α)Γ(1 + 2/α).
Proof 6 See Appendix A.1.
Next, we derive the lower bound on the SOP in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 The lower bound on the SOP of any link in the considered MANET under
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the AN-based Aloha protocol is
pAN,LBso =
2λEπτ







α r2−λEπr2− βeτP Wer
α
rdr. (5.12)
where βe = 2
Re − 1, θ = πpλLΓ(1− 2/α)Γ(1 + 2/α).
Proof 7 To derive the lower bound, we only consider the eavesdropper nearest to the
transmitter. We define |Xie∗| the distance between the typical transmitter i and the
nearest eavesdropper e∗. The probability density function f|Xie∗ |(r) of the |Xie∗ | is
f|Xie∗ |(r) = e
−λEπr22λEπr. (5.13)
Thus, we have
pANso ≥ P (SINRe∗ ≥ βe)
=
τ



















Computing the expectation of (5.14) in terms of |Xie∗| completes the proof.
5.2.3 Secrecy Transmission Capacity Analysis
Finally, we obtain the lower bound on the secrecy transmission capacity based on
the COP in Lemma 3 and the upper bound on the SOP in Lemma 4. The result is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem V.1 Given a COP constraint σ and an SOP constraint ε, the secrecy
transmission capacity of the considered MANET under the AN-based Aloha protocol
can be lower bounded by
TANc ≥ pλL(1− σ)(R
max,AN
t −Rmin,ANe ), (5.15)
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where Rmax,ANt is given by




and Rmin,ANe is given by




Proof 8 The proof directly follows the definition in (5.3) with λAT = pλL, pco replaced
by pANco and pso replaced by p
AN,UB
so .
5.3 Secrecy Transmission Capacity for Secrecy Guard Zone
based Aloha Protocol
This section focuses on the secrecy transmission capacity analysis for the SGZ-
based protocol. We drive the COP and SOP in Subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, respec-
tively, based on which the secrecy transmission capacity is derived in Subsection
5.3.3.
5.3.1 COP Analysis
According to the SGZ-based protocol, each transmitter becomes active if and only
if there exist no eavesdroppers in its SGZ, which is a circle with radius D centered
at itself. In other words, each eavesdropper silents the transmitters in a circle with
radius D centered at itself. As a result, the locations of active transmitters follow the
Poisson Hole Process (PHP) [78], which is formed by the baseline PPP ΨL and hole
PPP ΨE in the way that each eavesdropper e ∈ ΨE carves out a hole with radius
D from the PPP ΨL. Since exact modeling of the PHP is challenging in general,
we resort to a good approximation, which approximates the PHP by a homogeneous
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PPP ΨAT with density
λAT = pλL exp(−πD2λE), (5.18)
where exp(−πD2λE) is the probability that there are no eavesdroppers in the SGZ of
a transmitter.
Based on this approximation, we proceed to derive the COP, for which we fo-
cus on a typical link i → j again. Since j receives interference from simultaneous
transmitters, the SINR of j can be given by
SINRj =
PHij |Xij|−α∑
k∈ΨAT \{i} PHkj |Xkj|
−α +Wr
, (5.19)
The COP can be easily obtained based on Lemma 3, which is given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6 The COP of any link in the considered MANET under the SGZ-based
Aloha protocol is









where βt = 2
Rt − 1, ϑ = πλATΓ(1− 2/α)Γ(1 + 2/α).
Proof 9 See Appendix A.2
5.3.2 SOP Analysis
Since we consider the worst case where information signals form concurrent trans-
mitters will not interfere with eavesdroppers, the received signals of an eavesdropper







Following the derivations in Lemmas 4 and 5, the bounds on the SOP can be
easily derived in the following lemmas.
Lemma 7 The upper bound on the SOP of any link in the considered MANET under
the SGZ-based Aloha protocol can be given by











where βe = 2
Re − 1.
Proof 10 See Appendix A.3.
Next, we derive the lower bound on the SOP in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The lower bound on the SOP of any link in the considered MANET under








Proof 11 To derive the lower bound, we only consider the eavesdropper nearest to
the transmitter. We define |Xie∗| the distance between the typical transmitter i and
the nearest eavesdropper e∗. Based on the probability density function f|Xie∗ |(r) of the
|Xie∗| in (5.13), we have







Computing the expectation of (5.24) in terms of |Xie∗| completes the proof.
5.3.3 Secrecy Transmission Capacity Analysis
We obtain the secrecy transmission capacity based on the COP in Lemma 6 and
the upper bound on the SOP in Lemma 7. The result is summarized in the following
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theorem.
Theorem V.2 Given a COP constraint σ and an SOP constraint ε, the secrecy
transmission capacity of the considered MANET under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol
can be lower bounded by
T SGZc ≥ pλLe−πD
2λE(1− σ)(Rmax,SGZt −Rmin,SGZe ), (5.25)
where Rmax,SGZt is given by




and Rmin,SGZe is given by




Proof 12 The proof directly follows the definition in (5.3) with λAT = pλL exp(−πD2λE),
pco replaced by p
SGZ
co and pso replaced by p
SGZ,UB
so .
5.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
This section provides numerical results to validate the theoretical analysis of COP
and SOP under both secure Aloha protocols, and also to show the impacts of network
parameters on the secrecy transmission capacity performance.
5.4.1 COP Validation
We develop a Java simulator [79] that simulates the COP for both secure Aloha
protocols. The network parameters are set as follows: λL = 0.015, α = 4, P = 1,
βt = 0.4.
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Figure 5.3: COP vs. noise power Wr under AN-based protocol.
Figure 5.3 plots the theoretical and simulation results versus noise powerWr under
the AN-based Aloha protocol. In Figure 5.3, we set transmission probability p = 0.2
and consider three settings of transmission power ratio τ , i.e., τ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6. Figure
5.3 shows that the theoretical COP results match nicely with the simulation ones,
implying the correctness of the derived COP result. We can see from Figure 5.3 that
as the noise power Wr increases, the COP increases. This is because as the noise
power increases, the total interference at a receiver increases, leading to a smaller
SINR and thus a larger COP. From Figure 5.3 we can also see that as the power
allocation ratio τ increases, the COP decreases. This is because as τ increases, the
power for confidential information transmission increases, and so does the SINR of
the destination receiver, resulting in a smaller COP.
For the validation of the COP under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol, we plot
in Figure 5.4 the theoretical and simulation COP results versus noise power under
different settings of transmission probability p, i.e., p = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6. We set the radius
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Figure 5.4: COP vs. noise power Wr under SGZ-based protocol.
of the SGZ to D = 3 and the eavesdropper density to λE = 0.001. Figure 5.4 shows
that the theoretical COP results under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol match nicely
with the simulation ones, implying the correctness of the derived COP result. We
can see from Figure 5.4 that as the noise power increases, the COP increases due
to the same reason as in Figure 5.3. We can also observe that as the transmission
probability p increases, the COP also increases. The reason is that as p increases,
there will be more transmitters in the network, causing more interference at a receiver
and thus leading to an increased COP.
5.4.2 SOP Validation
The Java simulator [79] is also used to simulate the SOP for both secure Aloha
protocols. The parameters are set as follows: λE = 0.001, α = 4, P = 1, βe = 0.01.
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Figure 5.5: SOP vs. noise power We under AN-based protocol.
0.015, τ = 0.2, p = 0.2 and summarize the theoretical results (upper bound and
lower bound results) and simulation results versus noise power We at eavesdroppers
in Figure 5.5. We can see from Figure 5.5 that the upper bound matches nicely with
the simulation results, while the lower bound does not, implying that the upper bound
is effective to model the SOP performance of the network. Figure 5.5 shows that as
noise power We increases, the SOP decreases. This is because as We increases, the
SINR at an eavesdropper becomes smaller, leading to a smaller SOP.
For the validation of the SOP under the SGZ-based Aloha protocol, Figure 5.6
shows the theoretical and simulation results of SOP versus noise power We under
different settings of D, i.e., D = 3, 6. Similarly, Figure 5.6 shows that the upper
bound is tight enough to depict the SOP performance of the network under the SGZ-
based Aloha protocol. We can see from Figure 5.6 that as the noise power increases,
the SOP decreases due to the same reason as in Figure 5.5. Figure 5.6 also shows
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Figure 5.6: SOP vs. noise power We under SGZ-based protocol.
that as the radius of SGZ D increases, the SOP decreases. The reason is that as D
increases, the distances between eavesdroppers and the typical transmitter become
larger. Thus, the signal power received by the eavesdroppers will decrease, and so
does the SOP.
5.4.3 Secrecy Transmission Capacity vs. Transmitter Density
This part explores the impacts of the transmitter density λT on the secrecy trans-
mission capacity performance in MANETs under both secure Aloha protocols. We
assume that the legitimate receiver density is fixed. The network parameters are set
as follows: λR = 0.01, λE = 0.001, α = 4, P = 1, Wr = We = 0.001, σ = 0.4.
For the AN-based Aloha protocol, in Figure 5.7, we set the power allocation ratio
τ = 0.4 and consider three settings of ε, i.e., ε = 0.3, 0.5, 1. Figure 5.7 shows that,
the secrecy transmission capacity first increases and then decreases as the transmitter
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Figure 5.7: Secrecy transmission capacity vs. transmitter density λT under AN-based
protocol.
density λT increases, and thus there exists an optimal λT that maximizes the secrecy
transmission capacity. We can also observe that the secrecy transmission capacity
increases as the SOP constraint ε increases. This is because as ε becomes larger, the
security requirement becomes lower, allowing a smaller minimum required rate Re.
As a result, the secrecy transmission capacity increases.
For the secrecy transmission capacity performance under the SGZ-based Aloha
protocol, Figure 5.8 depicts the secrecy transmission capacity vs. λT under different
settings of ε for D = 3. We can see that, similar to Figure 5.7, there also exists an
optimal λT for each value of ε, and the secrecy transmission capacity also increases
as the SOP constraint ε increases.
5.4.4 Secrecy Transmission Capacity vs. Power Allocation
This part explores the impact of the power allocation ratio τ on the secrecy trans-
mission capacity performance in MANETs under the AN-based Aloha protocol. Fig-
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Figure 5.8: Secrecy transmission capacity vs. transmitter density λT under SGZ-
based protocol.
ure 5.9 plots secrecy transmission capacity versus τ for different λE under the settings
of λL = 0.015, p = 0.2, α = 4, P = 1, Wr = We = 0.001, σ = 0.4, ε = 0.3. We can
observe from Figure 5.9 that as the power allocation increases, the secrecy transmis-
sion capacity of the network first increases and then decreases. Thus, there exists an
optimal power allocation ratio τ that maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity.
A careful observation indicates that the optimal τ increases as λE decreases. This is
because as λE decreases, the security requirement becomes lower, allowing the smaller
AN transmission power (1− τ)P . As a result, the τ increases.
5.5 Summary
This chapter explored the physical layer security-based secure communications
in a infinite Poisson MANET. We proposed an artificial noise (AN)-based Aloha
protocol and a secrecy guard zone (SGZ)-based Aloha protocol for the network. To
65
Figure 5.9: Secrecy transmission capacity vs. power allocation ratio τ under AN-
based protocol.
understand the security and reliability performances of the proposed secure Aloha
protocols, we analyzed the COP as well as the upper and lower bounds on the SOP
of the considered network. Based on the COP and SOP, we then derived the secrecy
transmission capacity of the network under both protocols. Numerical results in this
work showed that the proposed secure Aloha protocols can significantly improve the
secrecy transmission capacity of networks for the worst case where information signals
from the transmitter will not interfere with the eavesdroppers. For a network with
the AN-based Aloha protocol, our theoretical analysis can serve as a guideline on the
proper setting of power allocation ratio such that the optimal secrecy transmission




In this thesis, we studied the secure protocol design in MANETs, where the typical
PHY security techniques, such as secrecy guard zone (SGZ), cooperative jamming
(CJ) and artificial noise (AN), are adopted to ensure secure communications. We
first explored the SGZ-based secure protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs, and then
investigated the CJ-based secure protocol in cell-partitioned MANETs. Finally, we
examined the secure protocols based on AN and SGZ in continuous MANETs.
For the secure protocol design of wireless networks, we studied in Chapter III the
SGZ-based protocol in a cell-partitioned MANET with multiple legitimate nodes and
multiple eavesdroppers. We considered a scenario where each transmitter can detect
the existence of eavesdroppers in a region around itself, called SGZ. For this scenario,
we proposed an SGZ-based secure protocol, in which the transmission of a selected
transmitter will be conducted only if no eavesdroppers exist in its SGZ. We then
derived exact analytical expression for the secrecy throughput capacity performance
of the concerned network under the proposed secure protocol based on the analysis of
two basic secure transmission probabilities. The main results in Chapter III showed
that SGZ is an effective technique to provide security for wireless communications.
In Chapter IV, we addressed the CJ design issue in large-scale wireless networks,
for which proposed a CJ-based secure protocol to ensure the secure transmission of
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a finite cell-partitioned MANET with multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eaves-
droppers. The CJ-based secure protocol utilizes non-transmitting nodes to generate
artificial noise to suppress eavesdroppers in the same cell, such that transmissions can
be conducted only if all eavesdroppers in the transmission range are suppressed. The
exact analytical expression for the secrecy throughput capacity was also derived to
evaluate the performances of the proposed protocol. The results in this thesis indi-
cated that the CJ-based protocol outperforms the SGZ-based protocol with respect
to the secrecy throughput capacity performance when the SGZ is equivalent to the
transmission range.
In Chapter V, we studied the secure protocol design in continuous MANETs with
multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers, whose locations are modeled
by two independent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes, respectively. We first
proposed two secure Aloha protocols, i.e., AN-based protocol and SGZ-based protocol,
which implement commonly-used PHY security schemes on top of the conventional
Aloha protocol to ensure secure transmissions of transmitters. We then theoretically
analyzed the COP, the upper and lower bounds on the SOP of the network under two
secure Aloha protocols. Based on the COP and SOP results, we then determined the
secrecy transmission capacity of both protocols. The results in this chapter showed
that the proposed secure Aloha protocols can significantly improve the secrecy trans-
mission capacity of networks for the worst case where information signals from the
transmitter will not interfere with the eavesdroppers. For a network with the AN-
based Aloha protocol, our theoretical analysis can serve as a guideline on the proper
setting of power allocation ratio such that the optimal secrecy transmission capacity
in the network can be achieved.
The secure protocols in this thesis are proposed under the permutation traffic
model, so one possible future work is to explore the performance of the proposed
secure protocols under the spanning tree traffic model. Since this thesis derived the
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exact secrecy throughput capacity for a two-hop network, another interesting and
also important research direction is to study the performance in multi-hop MANETs







Proofs in Chapter V
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The SOP is the probability that the SINR of at least one eavesdropper is greater
than the given threshold βe. We use v(e) to indicate whether the secrecy outage
caused by eavesdropper e occurs. If the secrecy outage happens, v(e) = 1. Otherwise,
v(e) = 0. Thus, the SOP can be calculated as follows.































According to [75], applying the probability generating functional of the PPP ΨE
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and then changing to the polar coordinate system gives
















Next, applying the Jensen’s Inequality, we have
























































The Laplace transform of Iie is easy to derive, since Hie follows the exponential
distribution with unit mean, and the Laplace transform of Iīe follows from that of I0
since Iīe is also a shot noise process. After calculating the Laplace transforms, we
complete the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Based on the definition in (5.1), we have
pSGZco = P (SINRj < βt)































































−α is a shot noise process, (c) follows since Hij is




Since each transmitter chooses the nearest legitimate receiver as the destination
receiver. The distance |Xij| between the typical transmitter i and destination receiver
j is a random variable, whose probability density function (PDF) is given by [77]
f|Xij |(r) = e
−(1−p)λLπr22(1− p)λLπr. (A.5)
Taking the expectation of the last step in (A.4) in terms of |Xij| completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 7
We also use v(e) to indicate whether the secrecy outage caused by eavesdropper
e occurs. If the secrecy outage happens, v(e) = 1. Otherwise, v(e) = 0. Thus, the
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SOP can be calculated as follows.































According to [75], applying the probability generating functional of the PPP ΨE
and then changing to the polar coordinate system gives
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